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Rights of Adult Where Minor
Misrepresents Age
BY GORDON SLATKIN*
The fact that minors are continuously making many purchases and
even engaging in business has resulted in much litigation, sometimes with
disastrous results to adults. Because of this, some business men go so
far as to refuse to deal with minors entirely and most good business men
now make it a practice to inquire as to the age of persons appearing close
to their majority.
The general rule is that a minor may rescind his contract by return-
ing the consideration which he has received, or so much of it as remains.'
Some states add an additional qualification which, while allowing the
minor to rescind upon the return of the article purchased, holds the minor
liable for deterioration and depreciation.2 One state, Minnesota, has
adopted an anomalous rule under which the rights of the parties are
dependent upon the question of whether the contract was provident
from the minor's viewpoint. a But the rule concerning the return of
the consideration applies only to tangible property and in all jurisdic-
tions it is held that if the infant obtains money, no right to recover is
given the adult in the absence of fraud.
Of course many transactions take place with persons admittedly or,
*Of the Denver bar.
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from their appearance, obviously minors, and in other cases where the
minor is near his majority, no questions are asked and no representations
concerning age are made. With those cases we are not now concerned
as the present discussion will be limited to the rights of the parties where
the minor has falsely represented that he was of age, and his appearance
was such that the adult might reasonably rely upon that representation.
ACTIONS FOR FRAUD OR DECEIT
Where the minor falsely represents himself as being of age at the
time the contract is made and then, taking advantage of his minority,
rescinds the contract, the usual action brought by the adult has been one
for fraud or deceit.4  And there would seem to be no good reason why
such an action should not be sustained. For every other tort, the infant
is held liable, and surely when he deliberately and fraudulently induces
an adult to deal with him because of the adult's reliance on his statement
that he is of full age, he is not less culpable than when he injures another
by the negligent use of an automobile. He has been held criminally
liable for obtaining money under false pretenses because of a misrepre-
sentation of his age,5 and certainly it would be a poor rule which would
hold him guilty of a crime and subject to imprisonment for it and at
the same time relieve him from all civil liability for the same wrongful
and unlawful act. But the cases are not in accord on the question of
whether such an action can be maintained.
(a) Action in fraud or deceit permitted.
By the weight of American authority, the minor is held liable for
his fraudulent deceit. The leading case is Fitts v. Hall.
6  There the
plaintiff sold hats to the defendant, who represented that he was of age.
'The theory of estoppel has been applied in a few cases but the cases applying the
doctrine have produced a hopeless confusion. As a general proposition, however, it
may be said that a majority of the courrts will not estop an infant from setting up his
correct age in an action at law but will in a suit in equity. But in La Rosa v. Nichols,
92 N. J. L. 375, 105 Atil. 201, 6 A. L. R. 412 (1918). the court was of the opinion
that the distinction between law and equity ought not to govern the substantial rights
of the parties and that an estoppel should arise in both la w and equity actions. On
the other hand no estoppel is permitted under the rule of the federal courts either in law
or in equity. Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300. 26 L. ed. 87 (1880).
It must be noted that n full application of the doctrine of estoppel would have
the effect of enforcing the contract. If the infant were estopped to rely upon his correct
age, then his liability would be measured. not by what he had taken from the adult, but
by what he had promised to do plus damages for failure to keep that promise. That
being so, the doctrine would go further than merely protect the adult against loss.
Moreover, it would take away most, if not all. of the protection which the law has
provided for the infant.
The cases on this subject are collected in three annotations in 6 A. L. R. 416, 18
A. L. R. 520 and 90 A. L. R. 144.
'Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 135 Ky. 32, 121 S. W. 967, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1101 (1909): 22 Am. Jur. 468, §44.
9 N. H. 441 (1838).
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When the plaintiff sued on the note given for the hats, the defendant
pleaded infancy. Thereafter the plaintiff brought an action for deceit,
and the court held:
"But the representation in Johnson v. Pie (1665), 1 Lev.
169, 1 Keble 905, 913, 83 Eng. Reprint 353, and in the present
case, that the defendant was of full age, was not part of the con-
tract, nor did it grow out of the contract, or in any way result from
it. It is not any part of its terms, nor was it the consideration upon
which the contract was founded. No contract was made about the
defendant's age. The sale of the goods was not a consideration
for this affirmation or representation. The representation was not
a foundation for an action of assumpsit. The matter arises purely
ex delicto. The fraud was intended to induce, -and did induce, the
plaintiff to make a contract for the sale of the hats, but that by no
means makes it part and parcel of the contract. It was antecedent
to the contract; and if an infant is liable for a positive wrong
connected with a contract, but arising after the contract has been
made, he may well be answerable for one committed before the
contract was entered into, although it may have led to the contract.
It has been said that 'all the infants in England might be ruined,'
if infants were bound by acts that sound in deceit. But this cannot
be a reason why the action should not be maintained for fradulent
wrongs done, for the same reason would seem to apply equally well
in cases of slander, trover, and trespass. The latter are as much
the results of indiscretion as the former, and quite as likely to be
committed.-,
This case has been followed again and again by the courts of the
United States, and undoubtedly represents the majority rule.
A more recent case is Wisconsin Loan and Finance Corporation V.
Goodnough.8 In this case an infant signed a promissory note upon
which judgment was confessed. The infant thereupon came into 'court
and filed an answer setting up his infancy. The plaintiff, in reply,
alleged that the defendant fraudulently represented that he was of age.
The court recognized the two lines of authority but followed the rule
set out in Fitts v. Hall.' The Wisconsin court then set forth the condi-
tions precedent to an action of fraud and deceit against a minor for mis-
representation:
"The cases quite uniformly hold that the fraud must be actual,
not constructive; that mere failure of the infant to disclose his age
is not sufficient. This quite apparently for the reason that the in-
7Ibid. at 449.
'201 Wis. 101, 228 N. W. 484, 67 A. L. R. 1259 (1930).
'Supra note 6.
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fant himself may be unaware of the legal consequences of his acts,
and that it is his affirmative wrongdoing which leads to liability.
Some of the cases emphasize the fact that the infant must have had
actual discretion as opposed to legal discretion. That is a matter
it seems to use more properly disposed of in ascertaining whether or
not the person seeking to hold the infant reasonably relied upon the
representation made by him. Quite obviously a child 10 years of
age could not represent himself to be 21 years so as to warrant any
one dealing with him upon that representation." 10
The rule set out by the New Hampshire and Wisconsin courts
appears reasonable and just and a proper solution to the problem. It
has been followed in a number of other jurisdictions."
The Colorado Supreme Court has not ruled directly on this point.
However, Mosko v. Forsythe12 presents a somewhat analogous situation.
There the action was brought by the adult to replevin an automobile
under a chattel mortgage given for the purchase price of the car. To
this the defendant put in a plea of infancy and counterclaimed for the
amount paid by him on the purchase price. The court held that the in-
fant could not counterclaim in an action of replevin since the only issue
involved was the right to possession. The court further held that before
an infant may disaffirm he must return the goods, but the court did not
state whether he must make restitution if the goods had been depreciated
or depleted. On page 118 we find this statement:
"Plaintiff, either with or without knowledge of defendant's
age, in the absence of any representations thereof made by defend-
ant, dealt with the latter at his peril, without ascertaining his age,
when the specific property obtained by defendant was not a neces-
sity, and the authorities do not support any contention that an
automobile, under the facts here appearing, is a necessity."' 13 (Ital-
ics ours.)
The statement above appears to be dictum but there is at least an
implication that the adult might have a remedy if the minor had fraudu-
leantly misrepresented his age.
(b) Action in fraud or deceit denied.
As stated above, the weight of American authority holds that an
action for fraud or deceit may be maintained against an infant where
'0Supra note 8, at 109, 228 N. W. at 486.
"Davidson v. Young, 38 III. 145 (1865) ; Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind. 472, 9 N. E.
420, 58 Am. Rep. 53 (1886) ; Yaeger v. Knight, 60 Miss. 730 (1883) : Eckstein v.
Frank, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 334 (1863) ; Schunemann v. Paradise, 46 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
426 (1873): Neff v. Landis, 110 Pa. 204, 1 At. 177 (1885): Kilgorev. Jordan, 17
Tex. 341 (1856); 27 Am. Jur. 818, §96.
"102 Colo. 115. 76P. (2d) 1106 (1938).
'"'Ibid. at 118, 76 P. (2d) at 1107-1108.
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the latter falsely represents that he is of full age. But a smaller, though
respectable, number of cases hold to the contrary. The rule that such
an action cannot be maintained is sometimes referred to as the English
or the Massachusetts rule. It finds its foundation in the case of Johnson
V. Pie.14  There the defendant falsely and fraudulently asserted that he
was of full age. He thereupon executed a mortgage to the plaintiff and
then repudiated the mortgage. It was held that the defendant was not
liable in fraud or deceit, and the reason given was that to hold him liable
for the tort would be to hold him liable on the very contract which the
minor had entered into with the plaintiff.
An analysis of this position clearly shows its error, because the
action is founded on deceit and not on contract, and the measure of
damage is the value of that which the adult has parted with on the faith
of the infant's misrepresentation and not what the infant promised to do
or what he promised to pay. It is true that if the contract were a reason-
able one, the two might probably be nearly the same, but that is purely
a coincidence.
The rule laid down in Johnson v. Pie has been followed quite
generally by the English courts. But the injustice of the rule has been
the cause of many limitations.
The dissatisfaction of the English courts with their own rule is
probably best shown in the case of Leslie v. Sheill.15 In that case an
infant, misrepresenting that he was of age, obtained a loan of f400
from money lenders and the latter brought an action of deceit. The
court felt that it was obligated to follow the rule of Johnson v. Pie, but
from a reading of the whole opinion it can be seen that the court was
reluctant to do so. Said the court:
"As Lord Kenyon says in Jennings v. Rundall (1765), 3
Burr. 1804, alluding to Zouch v. Parson (1799), 8 T. R. 335,
at p. 337, 'this protection was to be used as a shield and not as a
sword; therefore if an infant commits an assault or utter slander,
God forbid that he should not be answerable for it in a Court of
justice. But where an infant has made an improvident contract
with a person who has been wicked enough to contract with him,
such person cannot resort to a Court of law to enforce such con-
tract.' It is perhaps a pity that no exception was made where, as
here, the infant's wickedness was at least equal to that of the person
who innocently contracted with him, but so it is. It was thought
necessary to safeguard the weakness of infants at large, even though
here and there a juvenile knave slipped through. The rule is well
1 I Lev. 169. 1 Keble 905. 83 Eng. Rep. 353 (1665).
3 K. B. 607, Ann. Cas. 1916C 992 (1914).
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settled. No action of. deceit lay against the present appellant
* * "10
But while the English courts have steadily held that an action for
fraud or deceit could not be maintained against the infant, it was held in
Valentini v. Canali' 7 that where the contract related to property or the
use thereof, before the minor was entitled to rescind he must make full
restitution, even in the absence of fraud. It would seem that this would
have the effect of enforcing the contract even more directly than if the
minor were held liable for his fraud.
It is difficult to see why an infant should be allowed to retain the
fruits of his fraud if it is money and be forced to return what he has
obtained if it is property. The mere fact that the infant must be sued
when he has obtained money and himself sue where he has obtained
property (his action being to recover back money that he has paid for
property) should provide no reason for the distinction. Nevertheless,
such is the English rule.
The courts of Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Okla-
homa and Vermont have carried the rule of non-liability of the infant
even beyond that followed by the English courts.," Massachusetts, in
particular, appears to give to an adult no protection whatever from a
conniving minor.1"
The courts of New York have arrived at a thoroughly inconsistent
result. In Steckly v. Normandy National Securities Corporation20 the
infant tendered back stock which he had purchased from the defendant
and then sued for the purchase price. In the meantime, while the infant
held the stock, it had greatly depreciated in value. The defendant pleaded
that the infant had fraudulently misrepresented his age and that the
defendant relied upon those statements in selling the stock. The court,
while approving Rice v. Butler,21 which held that the infant must pay
for wear, tear and depreciation regardless of whether he was guilty of
fraud or not, held that no counterclaim for fraudulent misrepresentation
or estoppel might be urged, thus apparently overlooking Eckstein v.
'"Ibid. at 612, Ann. Cas. 1916C at 993.
"7L. R. 24, Q. B. Div. 166, 59 L. J. Q. B. (N. S.) 74, 61 L. T. (N. S.) 731,
38 Week. Rep. 331, 54 J. P. 295 (1889).
'Monumental Building Assn. v. Herman. 33 Md. 128 (1870) ; Slayton v. Berry,
175 Mass. 513., 56 N. E. 574 (1900); Greensborough Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer,
185 N. C. 109, 116 S. E.'261 (1923); International Land Co. v. Marshall, 22 Okla.
293, 98 Pac. 951 (1908): Nash v. Jewitt, 61 Va. 501, 18 Atl. 47 (1889). In
Maryland, however, it is held that the minor must make restitution even in the absence
of fraud. Adams v. Beall, 67 Md. 53, 8 Atl. 664 (1884).
"Slayton v. Berry, supra note 18.
2°263 N. Y. 245, 188 N. E. 726, 90 A. I.. R. 1437 (1934).
'Supra note 2.
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Frank22 and Schunemann v. Paradise,2 two early New York cases. The
New York court, therefore, reaches the inconsistent rule that even
though the minor be guilty of no fraud, if the transaction involves
tangible personal property which has been depleted or depreciated, the
minor before rescinding must put the adult in status quo, but if the
transaction involves intangible property as stocks which have depreci-
ated in value while held by the infant, even though the infant be guilty
of fraud, no similar obligation is placed on the infant.
NECESSITY OF RESTITUTION
In Myers v. Hurley Motor Company24 the Supreme Court of the
United States probably definitely settled the rule with regard to the
necessity of restitution by the minor before he should be allowed to
rescind his contract. There the plaintiff, who was twenty years of age,
represented that he was twenty-four and on the faith of that representa-
tion was allowed to purchase an automobile from the defendant at a
price of $650. The plaintiff used the automobile for approximately six
months, made default in his payments under a conditional sales contract,
and finally the car was repossessed by the defendant. The plaintiff then
brought an action to recover back the amount he had paid down and the
payments which he had made on the conditional sales contract. The
defendant set up as a counterclaim the amount of money necessarily
required to repair the automobile in order to put it in the condition in
which it was before it was sold to the plaintiff.
Two questions were certified to the Supreme Court. The first was
whether the plaintiff was estopped by his misrepresentations to set up
his true age. The court noticed the conflict in the authorities but, fol-
lowing Sims v. Everhardt,25 held that an estoppel could not be pleaded
by the adult. The second question was whether the defendant, by way
of affirmative defense, might set up the amount paid to repair the dam-
ages to the car. In answering that question, the court held that an action
brought to recover back any part of the payments made was an action
in assumpsit to which equitable principles were applicable.
"How far the equitable maxim, that he who seeks equity must
do equity, applies generally in suits brought for relief because of
infancy, we need not inquire; nor do we need here to go as far as
the authorities just cited. The maxim applies, at least, where there
has been, as there was here, actual fraud on the part of the infant.
l Daly (N. Y.) 334 (1863).
'46 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 426 (1873). It should be pointed out that these two
early New York cases may not have been brought to the attention of the court since
neither is cited in 90 A. L. R. 1438, which gives the citations of counsel.
2273 U. S. 18. 47 S. Ct. 277, 71 L. ed. 515, 50 A. L. R. 1181 (1927).
102 U. S. 300, 26 L. ed. 87 (1880).
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When an infant of mature appearance, by false and fraudulent rep-
resentations as to his age, has induced another person to sell and
deliver property to him, it is against natural justice to permit the
infant to recover money paid for the property without first com-
pelling him to account for the injury which his deceit has inflicted
upon the other person.
"Our conclusion that the affirmative defense is available in this
action does not rest upon the doctrine of estoppel, though the result
may be the same. It recognizes the plaintiff's right to repudiate his
promise and sue for the return of his payments, and his immunity
from a plea of estoppel in so doing. Its effect is not to enforce the
disaffirmed contract directly or indirectly, but to allow him to in-
voke the aid of the court to enforce an equitable remedy arising
from the disaffirmance, only upon condition that 'seeking equity,
he must do equity.' And the application of maxim is not precluded
because defendant's claim might not be enforceable in any other
manner."20
This case seems to have been the turning point with reference to
the necessity of restitution where the minor was guilty of fraud. Two
cases from Ohio illustrate the change in thought. In Summit Auto Com-
pany v. Jenkins,2" which was decided before Myers v. Hurley Motor
Company, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that where a minor falsely
represented his age in purchasing an automobile, and where the seller
took possession thereof, the minor could recover the amount paid by
him without diminution for the use of the automobile or damages for
its depreciation. Later in Mestetzko t. Elf Motor Company28- the Su-
preme Court of Ohio, on similar facts, came to an altogether different
conclusion. Concerning Myers vT. Hurley Motor Company, the court
said:
"The court therefore held that, seeking to disaffirm and avoid
his contract, the court should deal with him as it would with an
adult party, and should require him to restore what he received
when he parted with the property which he seeks to get back, and
this the more especially where it appears that the other party dealt
with him in ignorance of the fact of his nonage. The court further
held that the amount of the vendor's damage could only be allowed
in abatement or diminution of the infant's claim, and that the
vendor could not in any event recover an affirmative judgment. All
these principles are declared by the highest authority in the land
upon a review and discussion of the authorities and are in harmony
'Supra note 24, at 26, 47 S. Ct. at 279, 71 L. ed. at 519.
'20 Ohio App. 229, 153 N. E. 153 (1925).
1119 Ohio St. 515, 165 N.E. 93 (1929).
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with our own views, and we therefore adopt them as the proper
principles of law to be applied in the retrial of this case.' '29
Another case following Myers v. Hurley Motor Company is Stei-
qerwalt v. Woodhead Company,30 decided by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota. The court there found that the contract was not a provi-
dent one, under the peculiar Minnesota rule mentioned above 3 1 but held
on the authority of Myers v. Hurley Motor Company that the defendant
was entitled to recoup for the depreciation of the automobile and the
loss sustained in repairing the automobile.
Analyzing the rule, it will be noticed that it arrives indirectly at
the same conclusion that would have been reached directly had an action
in fraud or deceit by way of cross-complaint been permitted.
The rule of Myers v. Hurley Motor Company applies general rules
of tort law. But so far it has been applied and is perhaps impliedly
limited to those cases in which restitution may be urged as a set-off-
cases in which the infant has sought to recover moneys paid on the pur-
chase price. The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the rule
should be extended to permit the adult, in a direct action, to recover
money or property of which he has been defrauded by the infant's tort.
SUMMARY
In conclusion, we believe that the most advisable rule, the rule
which would protect the infant and at the same time protect the adult,
is the one holding an infant liable in an action for deceit where there is
fraud. This rule is not based on the contract but applies well known
and well established rules of tort law.
To require restitution, in the absence of fraud, will take away
much of the protection to which an infant is entitled. Not to permit
an action in fraud or deceit will leave an unsuspecting adult at the
mercies of a conniving infant. The doctrine of the necessity of restitu-
tion where there is fraud, announced in Myers v. Hurley Motor Com-
pany, is a good rule so far as it goes. But it was applied-perhaps lim-
ited in that case-to those instances in which it might be urged by way
of counterclaim to an action brought by the minor. However, there is
no reason why it should not apply as well to a direct action to recover
money or property furnished to an infant. While there have been no
cases in Colorado exactly in point, it is to be hoped that the Colorado
Supreme Court will follow the implication in Mosko v. Forsythe and
hold the infant liable in fraud or deceit.
-Ibid. at 584. 165 N. E. at 95-96.
'186 Minn. 558, 244 N. W. 412 (1932).
'Supra note 3.
"102 Colo. 115, 76 P. (2d) 1106 (1938).
